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Nothing New Under The Sun: The Minimalism of Chief Justice
Roberts and the Supreme Court's Recent Environmental Law
Jurisprudence
Damien Schiff*
During the confirmation hearings of John G. Roberts, the future
chief justice made clear that he would emphasize the importance of
collegiality on the Court, assembling unanimous opinions, encouraging the
deciding of cases on narrow grounds, in short, fostering judicial
minimalism. 1 That approach could easily be criticized as pollyannish,
insufficiently attuned to the realities of judging, especially as they are born
out on the Nation's high court. And indeed recently the Chief Justice's
approach has been criticized by those arguably in his own camp. 2 With
the country into the third term of the Roberts Court, it seems appropriate
to assess the Chief Justice's success in achieving common grounds,
reducing fractiousness, and staying the judicial hand (or at least imbuing
in his colleagues a sense of restraint). Perhaps no better field for
adjudging the Chief Justice's success exists than environmental law; it is
one of the most contentious areas of statutory law that the Court addresses.
Also, it presents in focused form the great judicial temptation: whether to
* Staff Attorney, Environmental Practice Group, Pacific Legal Foundation. The views
expressed in this Article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Pacific Legal Foundation.
1See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, "OfA JudiciaryNature": Observationson ChiefJustice's
FirstOpinions, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1027, 1042 (2007).
2See, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2582 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when
it comes at the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that hold the sure
promise of engendering further meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the future.
The rule of law is ill served by forcing lawyers and judges to make arguments that deaden
the soul of the law, which is logic and reason."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2683 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("Indeed, the (Chief Justice's] principal opinion's attempt at
distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive enough, and the change in the law it works is
substantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent views
concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the opinion
effectively overrules McConnell without saying so. . . . .[T]his faux judicial restraint is
judicial obfuscation.") (citation(internal citations omitted).
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enforce the judge's personal will or that of the legislature. Because
environmental cases are largely played out in pure statutory (or
administrative) law terms, they avoid the momentous constitutional
questions that tend necessarily to preclude judicial accord. Plus, because
environmental law is somewhat arcane and recondite, it is unusual for a
Justice to have a particularly vested interest in vindicating any particular
theme in environmental law. 3
In this article I intend to trace the Roberts Court's approach to
environmental law, and thereby measure the Chief Justice's relative
success in convincing his colleagues of the importance and value of
judicial minimalism, through a review of the six environmental cases the
Court has decided in the last two terms. 4 Those cases are two arising
under the Clean Air Act,5 EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy Corp.6
and Massachusettsv. EPA7 ; three under the Clean Water Act, Rapanos v.
UnitedStates Army Corps of Engineers,9 S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board
3 Justice

Douglas was, I think it fair to say, an exception, as a proto-environmentalist.
See, e.g., WILLIAM 0.DOUGLAS, MY WILDERNESS 137 (1960) ("Each Fall, when I say
farewell to my friends at Goose Prairie and head east, there are the same pleas. 'Don't let
them commercialize our high basins.' 'Don't let them cut any more trees.' 'Don't let
them build any more roads.' These are messages to the powers that be in Washington,
D.C.").
4 A word of explanation as to how I define "environmental cases." If the case concerns
the interpretation of a law or regulation principally designed to govern conduct that
immediately affects the physical environment, then I consider the case to "be about"
environmental law. An example of a case that I chose not to include here but which some
may classify as falling under the environmental law umbrella is UnitedHaulers
Association, Inc. v. Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste ManagementAuthority, 127 S. Ct.
1786 (2007), which upheld against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge a "flow
control" ordinance requiring all trash haulers to tip their loads at a government-owned
landfill. Certainly the case is to some degree "about" the environment (where and how
localities will dispose of their waste), but the principal legal issue presented (whether an
ordinance that discriminates equally against in-state and out-of-state trash haulers in
favor of a government-owned monopoly is constitutionally permissible absent
Congressional authorization) is intrinsically economic, not environmental.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). et seq.
127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007).
7 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
833 U.S.C. §§ 1251 etseq-1387 (2006).
9 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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0 and National Association of Home
of Environmental Protection,1
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife" (which also concerned the Endangered
Species Act' ); and one Superfundl 3 case, United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp.I4
My method for analyzing these cases through the Roberts
minimalist lens involves several factors: whether the Court's disposition is
"environmentally friendly"; whether the result actually reached by the
Court is consistent with a Roberts minimalist outcome; and, if the Court's
outcome is consistent with Roberts's minimalism but not environmentally
friendly, whether the Chief Justice's vote was decisive to that outcome.
As part of the analysis, I shall ascertain whether the Chief Justice's
minimalism is simply another name for originalism, textualism or any
other interpretive theory that had currency among the Court's
"conservatives" even prior to the Chief Justice's elevation; or if, instead, it
is something new under the judicial sun and embodies a triumph of
advocacy on the Chief Justice's part.
My analysis contains a few presuppositions, among them that there
are sitting Justices for whom minimalism is an occasional good but for
whom environmental protection is a trumping good. These are Justices
who have no necessary objection to an opinion consistent with
minimalism, but who indeed have an objection to an environmentally
unfriendly outcome. The assumption is important because, as we shall see
below, the Chief Justice's minimalism is content-independent (meaning
that it is just as capable of producing an environmentally friendly as an
environmentally unfriendly result). The Chief Justice's vote in a given
case may be consistent with that of the aforementioned "environmentalist"

'0 126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006).
" 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).

16 U.S.C. § § 1531-1599 (2006) et seq.
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). et seq.
14 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
15I recognize that the relative success of the Chief Justice in winning his colleagues
over
to his minimalism is based upon more than just obtaining dispositions that are consistent
with that theory's take on the law, because the collegial minimalism that the Chief Justice
advances requires more than victories, it requires near unanimity among the Court's
members, a task presumably made easier by minimalism's preference for narrow (and
thus less far-reaching decisions).
12

13Comprehensive

3
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Justices, but that consistency cannot necessarily be ascribed to a success of
the Chief Justice's minimalism. Accordingly, a necessary condition to
ascertaining the effect of the Chief Justice's minimalism on the Court,
based on any given case, is that the case's disposition be environmentally
unfriendly yet also minimalist (although traces of minimalism can surely
be detected even in other circumstances). And I shall attempt to note that
condition, where it exists, along the way.
Before addressing the cases, I shall set forth what I understand to
be the Chief Justice's minimalism, relying principally upon Roberts's
statements at his confirmation hearing. Then, I shall set forth a brief
typology of various minimalist "camps," including Cass Sunstein's
"narrow and shallow" minimalism,16 so-called "Burkean" minimalism,17
"neutral principles" minimalism,1 8
"prudentialist" minimalism19
(associated with the late Judge Henry Friendly), and "principled"
minimalism. 2 0 I shall then categorize the Chief Justice's brand of
minimalism within that typology. Once having identified the kind of
minimialism to which the Chief Justice subscribes, I shall analyze the six
environmental cases named above to determine whether (1) their
outcomes are distinctively minimalist; (2) the Chief Justice's vote in those
cases is consistent with his professed brand of minimalism; and (3) the
Chief Justice's vote was decisive to the Court's minimalist (or otherwise)
disposition.
I shall conclude that the Chief Justice's "minimalism" is really
nothin more than the "faint-hearted" originalism advanced by Justice
Scalia. 1 This is originalism in that it takes the plain meaning of the text,
as commonly and publicly understood at the time of the text's enactment
as dispositive, and "faint-hearted" in that in some circumstances that
1

See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (Harvard University Press
1999).
17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
6

1 See Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
1 See Daniel Breen, Avoiding "Wild Blue Yonders ": The PrudentialismofHenry J
Friendly andJohn Roberts, 52 S.D. L. REV. 73 (2007).
20 See Jonathan T. Molot, PrincipledMinimalism: Restriking the Balance between
JudicialMinimalism and NeutralPrinciples,90 VA. L. REV. 1753 (2004).
21 Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 UNiv. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989)
("I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.")
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meaning can be influenced by precedent or the interpretations of
agencies). Also, that the Chief Justice has had, and will have, no
jurisprudential influence, within the context of environmental law cases,
on his colleagues who have not hitherto accepted the interpretive theories
of the Court's jurisprudential conservatives.
I. MINIMALISM

A.

The 'judicialhumility" of ChiefJusticeRoberts: a
tour d'horizon

Perhaps the most apt descriptor for the Chief Justice's brand of
minimalism is "judicial humility." Variations of that phrase popped up
repeatedly during Roberts's confirmation hearings, and the term nicely
identifies the Chief Justice's attitude toward the law. For in fact Roberts's
minimalism is, jurisprudentially, not significantly different from the
ostensible "maximalism" of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 2 2 but his judicial
personality does differ from these latter Justices', in what might be termed
the "accidentals" of judging.
The Chief Justice's minimalism is best understood with reference
to two broad categories, each consisting of three reference points. Those
categories are "neutral principles," 23 and what I term "rules of judicial
comportment." The former category comprises three reference points:
Text (which includes things like the "Case or Controversy" standing
doctrines 24); Tradition (which includes the doctrine of stare decisiS25); and
Deference (which consists principally in the recognition that the Judicial
For a discussion of maximalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 47, 49-50; Alternatively, Professor Sunstein refers to Justices Scalia and Thomas
as "fundamentalists," and places Chief Justice Roberts somewhere closer to the
minimalist camp. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism v. Fundamentalism,The New
Republic, availableat http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=2005080 1&s=sunstein080105
(Aug. 1, 2005).
23 A phrase that I derive from Professor Wechsler's writings. Cf Wechsler, supra note
18, at 1619-20.
24 Cf U.S. CONST. artArt. III,
§2, cl. 1.
25 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th rev. ed. 1968) ("To abide by,
or adhere to, decided
cases.").
22

5
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Branch is not the main federal policymaker, and thus which encourages
judicial deference to legislative and administrative decisions). The latter
category of the rules of judicial comportment also comprises three
reference points: Consensus (pertaining principally to achieving
unanimous or near-unanimous opinions on the Court), Clarity (with
reference mainly to the desire to avoid plurality and concurring opinions
and thus to achieve a clear holding of the Court), and Productivity
(encouraging an increase in the number of cases the Court takes and
decides).
I have gleaned these factors from a close reading of the Chief
Justice's confirmation hearings. Below I set forth why I consider those
factors to capture Roberts's judicial philosophy. I believe that the
confirmation hearings are a better and more reliable source than the Chief
Justice's opinions while on the Court of Appeals, because he was asked
directly in the hearings what his thoughts are on judging and the role of
the judge in the federal system; those same issues were addressed
indirectly-if at all-while Roberts was a court of appeals judge.
In his opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Roberts made clear through an analogy that would turn up repeatedly in
the hearings that he viewed the role of the judge as passive.
My personal appreciation that I owe a great debt to
others reinforces my view that a certain humility should
characterize the judicial role. Judges and Justices are
servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited
role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
Judges have to have the humility to recognize that
they operate within a system of precedent shaped by other
judges equally striving to live up to the judicial oath, and
judges have to have the modesty to be open in the
decisional process to the considered views of their

6
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colleagues on the bench.26
The judge's job when taking a passive role is not to enforce his
own preferences or desires, not to make law, but rather to say what is the
law. As part of that process, the judge ought to acknowledge that he is
likely not the first person to be presented with the question, and that it is
fitting for the judge to look at the work of past judges for insight into the
question before him now. In this way, Tradition (in the form of stare
decisis) provides a support to a judge's humility. As Roberts explained,
"Given my view of the role of a judge, which focuses on the appropriate
modesty and humility, the notion of dramatic departures is not one that I
would hold out much hope for." 27
In the biographical statement submitted to the Judiciary
Committee, Roberts was asked for his views on "judicial activism." He
identified five characteristics of that activism which, when inverted, nicely
reveal Roberts's views on judicial humility. For Roberts, judicial activism
is indicated by:
a.
a tendency by the judiciary toward problem-solution
rather than grievance-resolution;
b.
a tendency by the judiciary to employ the individual
plaintiff as a vehicle for the imposition of far-reaching
orders extending to broad classes of individuals;
c.
a tendency by the judiciary to impose broad,
affirmative duties upon governments and society;
d.
a tendency by the judiciary toward loosening
jurisdictional requirements such as standing and ripeness;
and
e.
a tendency by the judiciary to impose itself upon
other institutions in the manner of an administrator with
continuing oversight responsibilities. 2 8
ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of
the United States: Hearingbefore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 55
(2005) [hereinafter Hearings].
27 Id. at
251.
26

28

1Id. at 121.
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Each of these "tendencies" can be rephrased to reflect the attitudes
of the "humble" judge, who evinces a desire:
to resolve legal disputes, not policy controversies;
a.
to remedy the injuries presented to the court, and
b.
not the injuries of hypothetical litigants;
to make law one step at a time, and to eschew
c.
broadly crafted rules based upon few cases;
to decide discrete "Cases or Controversies"; and
d.
to leave the intricacies and particularities of remedy
e.
to executive bodies.
Roberts elaborated on these points in written responses to
questions propounded by Senator Kennedy:
I understand "judicial activism" to refer to a judge
who has transgressed the limited role assigned to the
judicial branch under the Constitution, and has either
undertaken to exercise the legislative function by imposing
his own personal policy preferences under the guise of
legal interpretation, or has arrogated to himself the
executive function by imposing his policy views of how the
law should be administered.2 9
Thus, a judge ceases to be "humble" and becomes "arrogant"-or
in other words stops being a minimalist-at that point when he can no
longer fairly be said to interpret the law. Of course, the humble judge is
not supine, because the principal obligation of the judiciary is to say what
the law is. The judge must be prepared to overturn laws that conflict with
the Constitution (and presumably regulations that conflict with the
authorizing statute), and such action can in no wise be termed judicial
activism. 3
Roberts's hallmarks of the "humble" judge nicely match the
29

30

1d. at

591.

1d. at 165.
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jurisprudential practice of Henry J. Friendly, the famed Second Circuit
Court of Appeals judge for whom Roberts clerked immediately out of law
school. During his confirmation hearings, Roberts had high praise for
Judge Friendly's approach to judging:
With Judge Friendly . . . he had such a total

commitment to excellence in his craft at every stage of the
process, just a total devotion to the rule of law and the
confidence that if you just worked hard enough at it, you'd
come up with the right answers. And it was his devotion to
the rule of law that he took the most pleasure in. He liked
the fact that the editorialists of the day couldn't decide
whether he was a liberal or a conservative.

...

And also he did have an essential humility about
him. He was an absolute genius. I mean there's no doubt
about it, and certainly whatever he was reviewing, the
decision of an agency, the decision or its legislature, the
notion of saying, you know, we defer to them because it's
their responsibility, I think everybody would have agreed
we would have a better result if we just let him make the
decision, regardless of what it was. But he had the
essential humility to appreciate that he was a judge, and
that this decision should be made by this agency or this
decision by that legislature.31
In Judge Friendly Roberts sees all the traits of the "humble" judge:
devotion to the rule of law, deference to policymakers and a noble
reluctance to advance one's own thinking over that of one's colleagues.
The interpreter can thereby divine the two categories of Roberts's
minimialism, mentioned above: an adherence to neutral principles, such as
Text and Tradition, which reduces the likelihood of judicial
aggrandizement of policymaking power; and observance of certain
standards of judicial comportment, such as Consensus and Clarity.

31

Id. at 202.

9
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B.
JudicialHumility Under the Microscope: Neutral
Principlesand the Rules ofJudicial Comportment
A judge who subscribes to the Chief Justice's minimalism
will follow closely the legal text before him, 3 2 as well as the precedents of
the Court, and will defer to policymaking bodies where appropriate. As
for text, a Roberts minimalist is no deconstructionist.
I know that it's fashionable in some places to
suggest that there are no right answers and that the judges
are motivated by a constellation of different considerations,
and because of that it should affect how we approach
certain other issues. That's not the view of the law that I
subscribe to.
I think when you folks legislate, you do have
something in mind in particular, and you put it into words,
and you expect judges not to put in their own preference,
not to substitute their judgment for you, but to implement
your view of what you are accomplishing in that statute.
I think when the Framers framed the Constitution it
was the same thing, and the judges are not to put in their
own personal views about the Constitution should say, but
they are supposed to interpret it and apply the meaning that
is in the Constitution, and I think there is meaning there,
and I think there is meaning in your legislation, and the job
of a good judge is to do as good a job as possible to get the
right answer.
Again, I know there are those theorists who think
that is futile, or because it is hard in particular cases, we
should just throw up our hands and not try in any case, and
I do not subscribe to that. I believe there are right answers,
and judges, if they work hard enough, are likely to come up

with them. 33
2 Id. at
33

319.
Id. at 267; see also id. at 354.
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Yet a judge is no automaton. 34 Above all, the Roberts minimalist
is to follow neutral principles, and to eschew the insertion of his own
beliefs into the interpretive process. 35 Part of that process requires that the
judge at least begin with the original public meaning of the legal text in
question, 36 and to look to traditional and historical practice to divine the
meaning of otherwise ambiguous clauses. 37
As a corollary to adherence to text, a Roberts minimalist will pay
close attention to the question of standing: to whether the litigant before
the Court presents a controversy sufficiently adverse, and an injury
sufficiently concrete, to invoke the judiciary's remedial powers. 3 8
Tradition for the Roberts minimalist entails a profound respect for
the decisions of the Court. 3 9 Indeed, the degree to which a judge
acknowledges and incorporates precedent into his rulings is a good
indicator of just how "humble" he truly is. 40
Further, deference to the Republic's policymaking bodies is a
watchword for the Roberts minimalist. 41 And for good reason: if a judge
begins to set policy, then it's likely that the judge has transgressed the
bounds of the judicial role.4 2
When questioned by Senator Grassley on how to proceed where
the Court's precedents are not consistent with the Constitution's original
meaning, the future Chief Justice revealed that his minimalism very nearly
converges with the "faint-hearted originalism" of Justice Scalia. 43
Well, again, you would start with the precedents of
34

Id. at 205.
Id. at 227, 269-70, 327.
36
Id. at 159. Which also excludes reliance upon foreign sources of law. See id. at 201.
37
Id. at 323.
3
1Id. at 156, 161, 179, 342.
39 Id. at 357.
40
Id. at 158, 259-60.
41 Id. at 300.
42 Id. at
177-78, 206, 256, 353.
43 See Scalia, supranote 21, at 864. For criticism of that approach, see, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia'sInfidelity: A Critiqueof "Faint-Hearted"Originalism,75 U. CIN. L.
REv. 7, 13-14 (2006) (contending that Justice's Scalia's interpretive methodology is
results-oriented).
3

11
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the Court on that decision. In other words, if you think the
decision was correctly decided or wrongly decided, that
doesn't answer the question of whether or not it should be
revisited. You do have to look at whether or not the
decision has led to workable rule. You have to consider
whether it's created settled expectations that should not be
disrupted in the interest of regularity in the legal system.
You do have to look at whether or not the bases of the
Those are the main
precedent have been eroded.
considerations that the Court has articulated."
But the Roberts minimalist will also distinguish between "original
meaning" and "original application," the former and not the latter having
binding effect. The distinction between the two can be illustrated with
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. On its
face, the clause applies to all government activities, including public
education. Yet it is fair to say that the drafters and ratifiers of the clause
did not anticipate that it would forbid racially segregated public schools. 45
Hearings,supra note 26 at 181. Roberts's devotion to precedent is also revealed in his
surprisingly matter-of-fact acceptance of a constitutional right of privacy and of the
doctrine of substantive due process. Id at 186, 207. Under prompting from Senator
Graham, Roberts characterized Justice Scalia as a conservative, but declined to state
whether he viewed himself as more conservative than Justice Scalia. See id. at 252. It is
interesting to note in this respect that Justice Scalia, the avatar of faint-hearted
originalism, declines to afford stare decisis effect to "a constitutional doctrine adopted by
the Court [that] is not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled application."
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia's originalism is not to be confused with what Professor Sunstein has termed "soft
originalism." See Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 311, 313 (1996) (describing a "soft originalist" as one who "will take the Framers'
understanding at a certain level of abstraction or generality").
45 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 75 (Free Press 1990)
("[Brown] did not choose the face the uncomfortable fact that the effect on public
education was ignored [in the 14th Amendment's ratification debates] because no one
then imagined the equal protection clause might affect school segregation."). This is not
to say that Brown's outcome is inconsistent with an originalist understanding of the 14th
Amendment. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the Desegregation
Decision,81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952-54 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist
Justificationfor Brown: A Reply to ProfessorKlannan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995).
4

12
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But according to the Roberts minimalist, the expectations of the drafter
and ratifiers cannot trump the plain meaning of the rule they
constitutionalized.4 6
The Roberts minimalist is of course concerned with more than
theory: he also cares for the process of judging. For a Supreme Court
justice, that concern involves rules for crafting opinions. On that point the
traits of modesty and humility, which for Roberts ground the minimalist
judge, come to the fore. Thus, fractured decisions, where no single
opinion commands a majority of the Court, are to be avoided.4 7 As
Roberts explained: "I think one of the things that the Chief Justice should
have as a top priority is to try to bring about a greater degree of coherence
and consensus in the opinions of the Court."48 But the Court should not
avoid otherwise important issues through the certiorari process, 4 9 and the
Chief Justice should not use his privilege of assigning opinions to shape a
substantive outcome.50 Above all, the minimalist must maintain a level of
courtesy and collegiality that eschews rhetoric and preset answers.5 1
At root, Roberts' minimalism is an intrinsic minimalism: the nature
of the judicial role, of deciding cases and not making policy but just
interpreting the law, ought to be sufficient to keep the judiciary in check.52
As Roberts bluntly put it, "I'm not an ideologue." 53
Thus, all of these factors-text, precedent, historical tradition,
deference to policymakers-support the Roberts' minimalist faith in the
rule of law and the ability-as well as the duty-of the judge to adhere to
neutral principles when deciding cases:
I had someone ask me in this process . . . 'Are
going to be on the side of the little guy?' And
obviously want to give an immediate answer, but as
reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the little
46 Hearings,supra note 26, at 182, 204, 298-99.
47 Id. at 303,
358.
48
Id. at 371.
49
Id. at 336-37.
'oId. at 435.
st Id. at 343.
52

Id. at 288.
ssId. at 443.
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should win, the little guy is going to win in court before
me. But if the Constitution says that the big guy should
win, the big guy is going to win, because my obligation is
to the Constitution. That's the oath. The oath that a judge
takes is not that I will look out for particular interests, I'll
be on the side of particular interests. The oath is to uphold
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that's
what I would do. 54
The minimalism of Chief Justice Roberts is therefore characterized
by the twin pillars of neutral principles and judicial reserve (or as I have
elsewhere termed the rules of judicial comportment). 55 We turn now to a
brief exposition of the typology of minimalism, with an eye toward
categorizing Roberts's views within existing theories.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF MINIMALISM
Perhaps the most prominent minimalist theorist in legal academia
today is Professor Cass Sunstein, of the University of Chicago. Professor
Sunstein has over the past decade developed a sophisticated minimalist
theory that relies upon concepts such as deliberative democracy,
incompletely theorized agreements, and "narrow and shallow" judicial
opinions; and his work draws to a large degree upon the proto-minimalist
writings of Alexander Bickel.ss Professor Sunstein is neither the first nor
the only minimalist. Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, whom we have already met tangentially through the review of
Chief Justice Roberts's confirmation testimony, maintained a theory that

54

Id. at 448.

I am of course not the only commentator to note some of these facets to the Chief
Justice's judicial personality. See Sykes, supra note 1, at 1042.
56 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (Yale Univ.
Press 1986) (1961) (chapter on "The Passive Virtues"). Cf Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in
Search of a Court, and Itself-JudicialMinimalism at the Supreme CourtBar, 103 MICH.
L. REv. 1951, 1957-58 (2005). Indeed, Professor Siegel concludes that the principal
good of Sunstein's minimalism is that it has "breathed new life" into the "grand Bickelian
tradition." Id. at 2019.
5
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has subsequently been characterized as "prudentialism,"57 and which
shares many points with Sunstein's minimalism. A close relative to
prudentialism, and one which likely influenced Judge Friendly's theory of
judging, is Professor Herbert Wechsler's theory of "neutral principles," 5 8
an exegetical approach that also finds much support in the Chief Justice's
statements. Lastly, Professor Jonathan Molot has recently advanced a
conservative (as it were) variant to Sunstein's minimalism, which he has
termed principled minimalism, a theory which again shares much in
common with the prudentialism of Judge Friendly and the neutral
principles of Professor Wechsler. 59
Below I explain each of these minimalist "types" and conclude the
section by placing Chief Justice Roberts's minimalism among those types.
A.

Sunstein's Minimalism

Professor Sunstein has written much on the subject, 60 but from his
numerous writings the essential elements of his brand of minimalism are
easily extracted. There are two principle features to a minimalist decision:
narrowness and shallowness."
As Sunstein explains, minimalist
narrowness entails "[p]roceeding one case at a time, [and] seek[ing]
decisions that resolve the problem at hand without also resolving a series
of other problems that might have relevant differences." 62 Thus, a
Sunstein minimalist will avoid issuing broad rulings that would decide
many cases not before the court.63 Narrowness is justified because courts
rarely have all the relevant information, and they lack an appreciation for
how a broad rule will apply in circumstances not presented or conceived

s7 See Breen, supranote 19, at 78.
58 See Wechsler, supra note 18, at 16.
59
Molot, supra note 20.
60 See
See Sunstein, Minimalism at War, supranote 22; Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without
Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 757 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward:Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV L. REv. 1733 (1995).
61SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 10-14.
62 Sunstein, Minimalism at War, supra note 22,
at 48.
63 SUNsTEIN, supra note 16, at 10.
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A Sunstein minimalist will also strive for shallow rulings. 6 5 A
shallow decision is one that relies upon an incompletely theorized
agreement; in other words, a decision that does not offer "deep" reasons as
justification, principally because the polity has not itself decided upon a
deep justification for the result that obtains. 6 6 A shallow decision allows a
court to reach an outcome that most people would agree with, without
having to articulate much theory to support that outcome. 67
Sunstein argues that his minimalism advances a number of
desirable substantive outcomes. It fosters the so-called "passive virtues"
of judging, among them: (1) declining to decide issues not before the
court; (2) refusing to hear unripe cases; (3) avoiding constitutional issues;
(4) respecting precedent; (5) declining to issue advisory opinions; and (6)
and distinguishing between holding and dicta. 68 Sunstein also asserts that
his minimalism reinforces democratic deliberation by both leaving issues
to be decided by the People through their legislatures, and promoting
reason-giving as well as public accountability. 69 As Sunstein claims,
minimalism "makes a good deal of sense when the Court is dealing with a
constitutional issue of high complexity about which many people feel
deeply and on which the nation is divided (on moral or other grounds)."7 o
Sunstein is careful to note that even his brand of minimalism must
6 Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 17, at 362.
65 SuNSTEIN, supranote 16, at 14.
66

Id. at 11, 13.
67 Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism:A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REv. 123, 123 (2005).
Although this aspect of Sunstein's minimalism seems to invite the exercise of arbitrary
power, Sunstein is careful to distinguish a principled yet shallow opinion from what he
terms a "subminimalist" decision, one which really does lack sufficient reasons to
support its outcome. SuNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 9-10. Interestingly, Sunstein notes that
the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, which overturned a Colorado constitutional
amendment that precluded governments from prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, is arguably an example of a subminimalist decision. Id. at 16.
68 SuNSTEIN, supranote 16, at 4-5.
9
70 Id. at 5.
Id. To his great credit, Sunstein does not argue that minimalism is a panacea. See
Sunstein, Testing Minimalism, supra note 67, at 128 ("When planning is important,
minimalism is hazardous; when minimialism imposes high decisional burdens on others,
the argument for minimalism is weakened.").
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be subdivided into various subtypes, including procedural minimalism,
substantive minimalism, democracy-forcing minimalism, and certiorari
minimalism.7 1 Perhaps the most significant of these is substantive
minimalism, to which Sunstein devotes an entire chapter of his book to
explaining and which, he claims, nicely coincides with the irreducible
minimum of rights for a successful modem liberal democracy. 72 In short,
substantive minimalism consists of protection against arbitrary
governmental action, protection for the rights of political speech and
religious practice, protection against governmental taking of property,
protection for voting, and a general acknowledgment of some degree of
personal autonomy for every citizen. 7 3 Sunstein contends that these
protections are for him descriptive rather than prescriptive; that is to say,
he does not incorporate those rights or governmental duties into
substantive minimalism because they are good, but rather because they
represent what Americans have already recognized in two hundred years
of constitutional development.
I think it important to note (as have Sunstein's critics 7 4 ) that
Sunstein's minimalism is not really content-free (observe his substantive
minimalism), and its use must be predicated upon an existing decisional
algorithm. When that algorithm (however derived or justified) produces a
result, then the minimalist construct applies to dictate whether that result
should be tempered according to the narrow or shallow metric, or any of
the passive virtues that serve as the handmaiden of minimalism. To put
the point a concrete using abortion: the Sunstein minimalist must decide,
by whatever means, whether there is a legal right to abortion; and once
having decided that, he must then determine whether the scope of the rule
71 Sunstein, Testing Minimalism, supranote 67, at 124-25.

SUNsTErN, supra note 16, at 63-64.
at 64-67.
74 See James E. Fleming, The Incredible Shrinking ConstitutionalTheory: From the
PartialConstitutionto the Minimial Constitution,75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2885, 2906-09
(2007) (concluding that Sunstein's minimalism is perfectionist, i.e., oriented toward the
achievement of certain predetermined policy goals); Stephen B. Presser, Was Ann
CoulterRight? Some Realism about "Minimalism", 5 AvE MARIA L. REv. 23, 43 (2007)
(arguing that Sunstein's minimalism may "simply mask[] a departure from the rule of
law"); Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist,89 GEO. L.J. 2297,
2314-15 (2001) (concluding that "procedural" minimalism is not operative without
Sunstein's "substantive" minimalism).
72

73Id.
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that he lays down to support the result must either be dumbed down or
made opaque (shallow), and whether its application must be narrowed.
Those considerations, as well as the ensuing decision, will be determined
independently of the meaning of the Constitutional provision that
supposedly justifies the case's outcome. To the extent that Sunstein's
minimalism is content-dependent, it departs from the Chief Justice's
understanding of the process of judging.
B.

Burkean Minimalism

As perhaps an agnatic ancestor of Sunstein's minimalism, Sunstein
offers the so-called minimalism of the great English politician and
political thinker Edmund Burke. 7 5 A Burkean minimalist stresses social
practice extending over time as illuminating the interpretation of the
Constitution.76 A Burkean minimalist resists a priori reasoning and
eschews abstractions.
Social judgment is preferable to individual
judgment, for the former is made up of many concurrent instances of the
latter, and "it may well make sense [therefore] to adopt a presumption in
[the social judgment's] favor."78 The role of a Burkean minimalist
judiciary is thus "to protect long-standing practices against renovations
based on theories, or passions, that show an insufficient appreciation for
those practices." 79 Alternatively, a Burkean minimalist may be one who
consistently evinces a prejudice in favor of democratic outcomes, a
presumption that Sunstein sees worked out in the jurisprudence of Justice
Frankfurter.8 0
The principal difference between straight Sunstein
minimalism and Burkean minimalism is that the latter counsels close
adherence to established practices, and is critical of judgments that depart
from those practices.
In that regard, Burkean minimalism shares much in common with
the minimalism of the Chief Justice, in that Roberts grants an important
75 See Sunstein, supranote 17, at n. 1.
76
1d. at 369.

369-70.
Id.at 371.
79
1d.at 373.
' 0 Id. at 383.
" Id. at 408.
77Id. at
78
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role in legal interpretation to precedent and tradition. The Chief Justice
perhaps parts company with the Burkean minimalist (as well as the
Sunstein minimalist) in his refusal to craft judgments to accommodate
democratic decisionmaking regardless of the outcome dictated by the text.
Yet, in placing meaning above results, Roberts shows an affinity to the
minimalism espoused by Professor Herbert Wechsler and Judge Henry
Friendly, which we explore below.
C.

The Minimalism ofNeutral Principles

As we have seen from the review of the Chief Justice's
confirmation hearings, one important component to his theory of
minimalism is the notion that the judge must never insert his personal
views or prejudices into the interpretive process. The judicial process is,
in the Chief Justice's view, fundamentally interpretive and not creative. In
this respect, the Chief Justice places himself in opposition to the Legal
Realists, who, holding sway in the legal academy for most of the first half
of the twentieth century, taught that the judicial process is in essence
either largely or wholly the application of a judge's particular policy
preferences to a legal dispute before him. 82
Much like John the Baptist crying in the desert, Professor Herbert
Wechsler of Harvard Law School was a strong and forceful voice against
Legal Realism. Wechsler set forth his view of the proper bounds to legal
interpretation in a famous law review article entitled "Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law." 83 In that essay, originally given as the
Oliver Wendell Holmes lecture, Wechsler explained his position that the
judge ought not to use legal interpretation as a flimsy pretext for the
assertion of his own views of policy; and yet, at the same time, the
fundamental duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is, whether or not
the answer is politically popular, or has the immediate effect of seemingly
frustrating democratic decision-making. It is this latter proviso to
Wechsler's minimalism that both separates him from theorists like
Sunstein and places him within the Chief Justice's jurisprudential
82 See generally Anthony D'Amato, The Limits ofLegal Realism, 87 YALE L.J. 468
(1978).
83 Wechsler, supra note
18.
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constellation.
The [judicial] duty, to be sure, is not that of policing
or advising legislatures or executives, nor even, as the
uninstructed think, of standing as an ever-open forum for
the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the
Constitution for support. It is the duty to decide the
litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the law,
with all that that implies as to a rigorous insistence on the
satisfaction of procedural and jurisdictional requirements. 84
As part of the duty to say what the law is, the judge, according to
Wechsler, must eschew an ad hoc approach, because it is an invitation to
85
The judge must be duly deferential to precedent
judicial manipulation.
86
and tradition, but needs not be bound by the original meaning of the
text.

The judicial process, in sum, is the deciding of cases according to
principles that extend beyond the exigencies of the case at bar. As
Wechsler explained:
A principled decision . . . is one that rests on

reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient
reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value
choices of the other branches of the Government or of a
state, those choices must, of course, survive. . .. The virtue

or demerit of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely on the
reasons that support it and their adequacy to maintain any
choice of values it decrees, or, it is vital that we add, to
Id. at 6. Wechsler's insistence upon the observance of "procedural and jurisdictional
requirements" reveals another parallel between his neutral principles and the Chief
Justice's minimalism, the latter which especially emphasizes the federal court plaintiff's
obligation
to establish Article Ill standing.
8
1 d. at 15.
6
Id. at 17.
7
Id. at 18.
8
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maintain the rejection of a claim that any given choice
should be decreed.
Wechsler does not explain which values are the relevant values, or
what the judge is to do when apparently neutral principles, equally capable
of deciding a case, conflict. But to his great credit, Wechsler concedes
that there is little principled basis for preferring "liberty" values over
"economic" values. 8 Whatever the nature of the value in question, the
judge's task is simply to ensure that the values he imposes upon the other
branches are values that find a basis in the legal text at issue. 9 0 In the end,
"[t]he real test inheres . .. in the force of the analysis." 91
Thus, Wechsler's "neutral principles" are minimalist both in their
de-emphasis of the role of the judge's personal views of the legal dispute
before him to the interpretive task, and in their twin acknowledgments of
the importance of tradition as well as the structural limitations of the
federal judiciary. But Wechsler's minimalism is decidedly not minimalist,
at least in the vein of Sunstein, insofar as Wechsler does not allow for the
judge to ignore the dictates of the text he is interpreting simply to avoid
trenching upon the decision-making of the democratic branches, or to
allow those branches to speak first to an issue of great import. In that
sense, the Chief Justice can find much common cause with Wechsler; after
all, it was the former who declared that he would rule for the "little guy"
when the law required it, and for the "big guy" when the law required
judgment in his favor. 92 Where Wechsler and the Chief Justice part
company, obviously, is on the degree of importance to ascribe to the text's
original meaning: for Wechsler, the original meaning is interesting but
certainly not determinative, because the correctness of a decision is not
predicated upon its adherence to the text's original public meaning but
rather upon whether its reasoning reflects reliance upon neutral principles
derived from the text.
Wechsler merits, however, some indulgence, in that legal realism
8Id. at 19-20.
9Id. at 25-26.

oId. at 25.

91 Id.
92 See

Hearings,supra note 26, at 448.
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and positivism were so well entrenched in the legal academy during his
time that the assertion of an authentic originalism was likely not possible.
But soon originalism would emerge as a viable alternative interpretive
theory to an exasperated legal realism, 9 3 and be capable of serving one
component in a new minimalism. It is an amusing coincidence that the
greatest judicial expositor of this proto-originalism-cum-minimalism was
Judge Henry Friendly, for whom Chief Justice Roberts clerked after law
school.
D.

Friendly'sPrudentialism

Henry Friendly was one of the foremost American judges of the
second half of the twentieth century, described by the equally prominent
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court as the "ablest
judge of his generation." 94 Friendly received his legal training from Felix
Frankfurter at Harvard Law School, 9 5 and much of Friendly's thought as a
judge reflects the tenets of the Legal Process School which had much
currency in the 1950s and 1960s. 9 6 But Friendly's twenty-plus years on
the bench revealed a jurisprudential leaning that has been termed
prudentialist, the hallmark of which is "the acute recognition that all
judicial activity takes place in an established political context within
which other institutions have equally legitimate roles to play in American
life."9 7 The prudentialist judge does not acknowledge the existence of
"absolute personal rights;" 98 his defining attributes are "modesty and
humility," and he recognizes rights "against the background of practices
and beliefs that make up the American tradition of law and
governance." 100 In short, the prudentialist judge: (1) respects precedent
See Bret Boyce, Originalismand the FourteenthAmendment, 33 WAKE FoREST L.
REv. 909, 910 n.1-2 (1998).
94 Roger Traynor, Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge offHis Generation,71 CAL. L. REV.
1039, 1039 (1983).
9 Breen, supranote 19, at 80.
" 6Id. at 82-83.
97
Id. at 86.
9 Id. at 87.
99 d.76
93

'00 Id. at 88.
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and constitutional text; (2) defers to other branches' decisions; (3) is
sensitive to the impact of judicial decisions on other branches; and (4)
desires to take into account society's historic beliefs in defining the scope
of individual rights. ''
The parallels between these hallmarks of prudentialism and the
Chief Justice's minimalism are striking.10 2 Roberts insists that a good
judge's personality must be marked by a certain humility which is
revealed through deference to tradition, text, and the decisions of
coordinate branches of government.103 Roberts is also cognizant of the
importance of recognizing individual rights within the backdrop of the
society's fundamental traditions. Perhaps the one point on which the
Chief Justice's minimalism departs from prudentialism is in his
commitment to enforcing the rule of law regardless of the impact of the
Court's decision on society. 10 It is this tension between the supposed
humility of the minimalist judge and his obligation to say what the law is,
a tension which we have already seen in the work of Professor Sunstein,
which outlines a major divide in minimalist theory, and one side of which
we explore below.
E.

PrincipledMinimalism

Professor Jonathan Molot has propounded a theory of what he
terms principled minimalism, in opposition to the supposed unprincipled
minimalism of Professor Sunstein. Molot notes the tension between
judicial restraint and the judicial obligation to pronounce what the law is,
and considers principled minimalism to resolve that tension. Drawing
upon both Bickel and Wechsler, 05 Molot crafts a via media, as it were,
between judicial discretion and judicial restraint. He cautions:
Judges who ignore the discretion inherent in the
judicial enterprise, and who purport merely to apply legal
0l

Id.

102See
103 See

id. at 89-90; 127-3 1.
Hearings,supra note 26, at 323.
' See id.
105See Molot, supra note 20, at 1775-76.
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principles without altering their meaning, run the risk of
aggrandizing their own power at the expense of future
judges and aggrandizing the power of past judges over
present ones. In contrast, judges who tend to acknowledge
the creativity inherent in the judicial enterprise-and to
recognize that legal principles are largely a product of past,
present, and future judges who articulate them in the course
of deciding cases-are less likely to let any single activist
judge decide too much.10 6
Molot goes on to explain that where judges lack confidence in the
correctness of a neutral principle, the resulting decision should be
narrowly crafted; and where judges cannot identify any neutral principle to
justify the result to which they are drawn, the resulting decision must also
be narrowly crafted. Molot thus creates a presumption of humility in
difficult cases, where neutral principles are either suspect or are
lacking. 0 7
Accordingly, principled minimalism is a function of judicial
confidence in getting the answers right. 0 8 In that respect, it jibes nicely
with Chief Justice Roberts's view that the Court must interpret the law to
the fullest, and not allow concerns about results or effect to determine the
substance of the Court's legal interpretation.109 Principled minimalism
also dovetails with the Chief Justice's desire to decide cases on narrow
grounds, both to produce clarity in the law and to avoid unnecessarily
broad grounds for decision.110 But where principled minimalism and the
Chief Justice part ways may well be in the former's tacit supposition that
some legal disputes do not have answers; and that post-modern response
the Chief Justice would definitely reject."'
F.

Classifying Roberts's Minimalism

To understand where to place the Chief Justice's minimalism
0o1d. at 1836 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1836-37.
08
Id. at 1837.
109 See Hearings,supra note 26, at 448.
no See id. at 303, 358, 371.
" See id. at 267, 354.
107
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within the typology adumbrated above, it is best to conceive of modernday variations of minimalism in terms of what I call a content-dependence
criterion. By that I mean the degree to which minimalism requires a judge
to stay his hand, even where the legal answer is readily ascertainable.
Using that criterion, it is clear that Professor Sunstein's minimalism is
extremely content-dependent, in that oftentimes a Sunstein minimalist
judge will have to make more shallow or narrow his decision if the
outcome of a wide and deep decision will frustrate democratic deliberation
or any other value that Sunstein associates with so-called substantive
minimalism.
Somewhat closer to the mean would be Burkean
minimalism, to the extent that a Burkean minimalist is limited in his
interpretation by the traditions of the bench and society, factors that both
encourage judicial humility but are also, significantly, part and parcel of
the interpretive endeavor.
And moving further still from content dependence would be
Wechsler's neutral principles, and Judge Friendly's prudentialism, both of
which rely to an important degree upon the rule of law itself to avoid
judicial overreach. Lastly, Professor Molot's principled minimalism
seems somewhere between neutral principles and prudentialism: obviously
Molot incorporates Wechsler's views but he is reluctant to embrace
Wechsler's faith in the judiciary's ability to select the right neutral
principle to decide a case. Nevertheless, principled minimalism is
moderately more content-dependent than prudentialism, to the extent that
the former seems to countenance judicial policymaking.
Where to place the Chief Justice on this continuum? The
minimalism proffered by the Chief Justice is undoubtedly principled, in
his adherence to text and tradition, and his willingness to defer to the
decision-making of other branches of government. But is it minimalist in
the sense of content-dependent? I would say no. The Chief Justice has
made plain that the law provides an answer, and that answer must be
adopted by the faithful judge regardless of the consequences. To be sure,
the Chief Justice also speaks of judicial humility, and thus impliedly of
minimalism, but that discussion seems born of the Chief Justice's
attachment to those principles that for him guide the judicial process. In
other words, the Chief Justice's minimalism is a function of his attachment
to the doctrines of standing, stare decisis, textualism, and originalism, all
of which limit judicial discretion but all of which form arguably the
25
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beginning point of every judge's interpretation. Where the Chief Justice's
minimalism parts company with more content-dependent variations of
minimalism is precisely in the latter's willingness to stay the judicial hand
where the dictates of principle require judicial action. In short, the Chief
Justice's minimalism is very content independent, and thus closely
resembles the jurisprudence of other prominent textualist-originalists, such
as Justices Scalia and Thomas, who are not typically identified as

minimalist.112
Having assessed both the nuts-and-bolts of the Chief Justice's
minimalism, and how it fits with other theories of minimalism, we turn to
an assessment of the Roberts' Court environmental cases.
III. THE CASES

As a first-cut matter, it seems relevant that of the six cases under
analysis, three were unanimous (or nearly so) (S.D. Warren Co., Duke
Energy, and Atlantic Research), and the other three were either 5-4 or 4-14 (Rapanos, Massachusetts, and National Association of Home Builders).
Thus, if a principal reason for the adoption of the minimalist program is to
obtain frequent unanimous opinions, then the Chief Justice does not
appear to be making headway in environmental cases.11 3 And if
minimalism also includes deference to agency determinations, then the
environmental cases of the Roberts Court are still, thus far, a mixed bag.
In the synopses that follow, I do not intend to give an exhaustive (i.e., like
a case note) review of the environmental cases, but I do wish to give the
reader a sufficient background to the cases to appreciate whether and to
what extent they are permeated by the Chief Justice's minimalism.
Often they are characterized as maximalist. See, e.g., Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. LAW REV. 4, at 11 (1996). But not always. See Eric R.
Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatismat the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 791, 795 (2005) (associating Justice Scalia with the minimalist camp).
113 Indeed, a third of the decisions produced during the 2006 Term were 5-4, the highest
percentage in a decade, and the number of unanimous opinions has fallen from 32 percent
in 2004 to 22 percent for the 2006 Term. Jeffrey Rosen, A ConservativeActivist Court,
The New Republic (July 14, 2007), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/07/13/opinion/main3056257.shtml (last visited
Oct. 24, 2007).
112
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A. EnvironmentalDefense v. Duke Energy Corp.

This case arose out of an enforcement action by the federal
government against Duke Energy for violations of the Clean Air Act. The
government contended that Duke's operation of its power plants had
violated regulations promulgated under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) amendment to the Act. Those regulations require that
for "major emitting facilities" 1 l 4 constructed after the passage of the PSD
amendment, or for such power plants that are subsequently modified, a
permit must be obtained if the new plant or newly modified plant would
increase its actual annual emission of a pollutant above the actual average
for the two prior years. 1 5 Less onerous emission standards, promulgated
under the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) amendment to the
Clean Air Act, apply to non-major emitting facilities; under those
regulations, a facility must use the best available pollution-limiting
technology if the new facility (or newly modified facility) would increase
its discharge of pollutants measured in kilograms per hour." 6
The judicial dispute focused on whether the NSPS or PSD
regulations applied to Duke's newly modified power plants; Duke's plants
met the NSPS but not the PSD standards." 7 The PSD amendment
expressly adopts the NSPS amendment's definition for "modification."" 8
Duke argued that the means for measuring emissions must therefore be the
same. The government (and environmental interveners) argued in
opposition that merely because NSPS and PSD defined "modification"
identically was insufficient to hamstring the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) from promulgating different emission measurement
standards under the two programs.
The Court, speaking unanimously"' 9 through Justice Souter, agreed
114 42

U.S.C. § 7475(a) (2006).
1" 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21)(ii) (2007).
116 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (2007).
117Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423, at 1430-31
(2007).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2)(C) (2006).
119 Justice Thomas declined to join in the Court's discussion of the canon of interpretation
that a statutory cross-reference mandates a consistent regulatory construction. See Duke
Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).

27

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 15, No. I
with the petitioners in that the common definition of "modification" does
not require EPA to use a kilogram per hour measurement for both NSPS
and PSD permits. 120 The Court rejected an attempt by the Court of
Appeals to harmonize the NSPS and PSD regulations on the premise that
both sets of regulations required a common emissions measurement.
Rather, the Court concluded the two sets of regulations cannot be
harmonized, in large measure because NSPS requires kilogram per hour in
contrast to PSD's two-year average mode of measurement.121 Because the
appellate court's construction of PSD regulations amounted to an
invalidation of those regulations, and the Act limits challenges to the
validity of regulations in enforcement proceedings,122 the Court vacated
and remanded the matter,123 presumably to allow the appellate court to
determine whether the common definition of "modification" requires that
the EPA promulgate identical regulations, and, if so, whether a challenge
to the PSD regulations would be time-barred.
Owing to the case's peculiar posture, it is difficult to divine
whether its ultimate result will be environmentally friendly and whether
the Chief Justice's vote to reverse the Court of Appeals is consistent with
his minimalism. Strictly speaking, the Court held only that (1) the EPA is
not compelled to prescribe differing standards for NSPS and PSD,
notwithstanding that both use the same definition of "modification," and
(2) the existing PSD regulations cannot be read to allow for a kilogram per
hour measurement. On remand, the Court of Appeals has at least two
available options. It can hold the PSD standards are an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute and therefore void (assuming that the
regulations can be challenged in an enforcement action at a later date). Or
it can hold either a challenge to the PSD regulations is time-barred, or
even if timely, that the regulations are a reasonable interpretation of the
statute. Thus, the Court's disposition of the matter does not dictate a
particular substantive result. But it seems fair to conclude the likely
outcome will subject Duke Energy to the more draconian PSD emission
standards.
120 Id. at

1433-34 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1434-36.
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2006).
123 Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. at 1437.
121

28

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN
Yet it is certainly true that the Court hardly did more than
necessary to reverse the judgment. 12 4 The Court merely determined a
common statutory term does not demand a common interpretation,125 and
the PSD regulations cannot be harmonized with the NSPS regulations, 12 6
insofar as they require different modes of emission measurement. The
Court did not decide whether the PSD regulations are a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, 12 7 or whether a challenge to those regulations
would be time-barred. 12 8 In these respects, Duke Energy is consistent with
the Chief Justice's minimalism, but because it is arguably proenvironment, it is not particularly probative of the Chief Justice's
influence on his colleagues.
B. Massachusettsv. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
The much vaunted "global warming" case concerned the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts's attempt to force the EPA to regulate
carbon dioxide from auto emissions. Massachusetts, along with several
other states and private organizations, had petitioned the EPA for
rulemaking on the grounds that carbon dioxide was an "air pollutant,"
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act, that contributes to air pollution
and may endanger public health or welfare.12 9 The EPA had declined to
act on the petition because it did not believe it was authorized under the
Act to regulate vehicle emissions to control global warming. Furthermore,
the EPA believed it lacked the means for resolving the global warming
crisis, and other federal agencies should take the lead in the matter.1 3 0
124 Justice

Thomas is undoubtedly correct that the Court's discussion of the canon of
interpretation regarding repeated use of the same statutory term is unnecessary to the
judgment, given that the Court also determined that the PSD regulations cannot be
reconciled on the relevant point with the NSPS regulations. See Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct.
Id. at 1437 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
125 Duke Energy, 127 S. Ct. Id. at 1434 (majority opinion).
12 6 See id. at 1436.
127 Rather, the Court merely indicated EPA's responsibility: to produce a regulatory
"construction ... [that] fall[s] within the limits of what is reasonable, as set by the Act's
common definition." Id. at 1434 (footnote omitted).
2' 8 See id. at 1436.
12942 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)(1) (2006).
130 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, at 1450 (2007).
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On review, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the EPA's
decision, but the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, concluded that the EPA's refusal to act on the petition was
illegal. Before reaching the merits, however, the Court had to address the
serious standing objections raised by the EPA. The EPA asserted that,
even assuming that the past and imminent reduction in Massachusetts's
coastline is attributable to global warming, it would be far too speculative
to conclude that (1) Massachusetts's injury is fairly traceable to the EPA's
failure to regulate carbon dioxide emitted from motor vehicles; or (2)
regulation of those emissions would to any significant degree redress
Massachusetts's injury, given the multifarious causes of global warming
other than American vehicle emissions.
The majority rejected those arguments on the grounds that
Massachusetts, as a state, enjoys special consideration in federal court
when it seeks to vindicate its interest as parenspatriae:
[Certain] sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in
the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to
protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing
standards applicable to the "emission of any air pollutant
from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines,
which in [the Administrator's] judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."
Congress moreover has recognized a concomitant
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural
right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasisovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to
special solicitude in our standing analysis.131
The majority concluded that Massachusetts had established the
injury, traceability, and redressability prongs of Article III standing. 132 On
the merits, the majority decided that EPA had the authority under the Act
131 Id. at 1454-55.
132 See id. at 1455-57.
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to regulate carbon dioxide for its greenhouse effects, 13 3 but had illegally
denied Massachusetts's rulemaking petition by basing its decision on
policy, rather than scientific grounds. 4
Although the merits of the case are of import to administrative
law, 135 for present purposes, I shall focus on the issue of standing, as that
best reflects both the Chief Justice's minimalist position in Massachusetts
and his failure to convince his colleagues in the majority of his
minimalism. As a preliminary matter, I think it goes without saying that
Massachusetts is almost an avatar of non-minimalist decision-making. 136
As will be seen below, the Court stretches (or expands, depending upon
one's attitude) existing standing doctrine, and rejects the EPA's policy
grounds for not regulating carbon dioxide emissions. Whether the Court
was right is beside the point, and I do not mean to speak to that issue here.
But if we were to place Massachusetts along Professor Sunstein's
minimalist-maximalist continuum, we would not be unjustified in placing
the case on the maximalist side.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito,
dissented on the question of standing.' 37 In his dissent, the Chief Justice
shows his minimalist stripes. Indeed, in many respects, the opinion's
opening paragraphs are a minimalist's cri de coeur. At the risk of
verbosity, I reprint those paragraphs here to emphasize how the Chief
1

See id. at 1459-62.

134 See id. at 1462-63.
135 1 have written elsewhere on what I believe to be the media's gross over
reading of the

Court's holding on the merits. See Damien Schiff, A question ofpower, not global
warming, S.F. CHRONICLE, availableat http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/04/29/EDGONPI9Ul.DTL&hw=global+warming&sn=002
&sc=873(last visited Oct. 24, 2007)Apr. 29, 2007, at E5.
I say almost because, to its great credit, the majority did not order the EPA to regulate
carbon dioxide, but rather allowed it to explain on remand why in its scientificjudgment
regulation of carbon dioxide would not be proper. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
1 Justice Scalia also wrote separately to dissent from the Court's merits holding, and
was joined in that dissent by the Chief Justice, as well as Justice Thomas. See
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. Id. at 1471-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued
that (1) the EPA could reasonably interpret the phrase "agent of air pollution" not to
include carbon dioxide, (2) the Clean Air Act does not require EPA to act immediately
upon Massachusetts's rulemaking petition but would allow a deferral of action, and (3)
the EPA had adequately explained why, in its judgment, regulation of carbon dioxide
would not be appropriate at this time. Id.
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Justice views a strict and healthy standing doctrine as essential to cabining
the judiciary's role in questions of high political import:
Global warming may be a "crisis," even "the most
pressing environmental problem of our time." Indeed, it
may ultimately affect nearly everyone on the planet in
some potentially adverse way, and it may be that
governments have done too little to address it. It is not a
problem, however, that has escaped the attention of
policymakers in the executive and legislative branches of
our government, who continue to consider regulatory,
legislative, and treaty-based means of addressing global
climate change. [T] Apparently dissatisfied with the pace of
progress on this issue in the elected branches, petitioners
have come to the courts claiming broad-ranging injury, in
attempting to tie that injury to the government's alleged
failure to comply with a rather narrow statutory provision.
I would reject these challenges as nonjusticiable. Such a
conclusion involves no judgment on whether global
warming exists, what causes it, or the extent of the
problem. Nor does it render petitioners without recourse.
This Court's standing jurisprudence simply recognizes that
redress of grievances of the sort at issue here "is the
function of Congress and Chief Executive," and not the
function of the federal courts. 13 8
Note how strongly the Chief Justice separates the merits of the
dispute before the Court-which the media aptly recognized by terming
Massachusetts the "global warming" case-from his would-be disposition
of the case. Roberts recognizes that the majority's decision arrogates to
the Court an issue that has been, and will continue to be, addressed by the
political branches. Interestingly, Roberts also implies that the petitioners
have come to the Court-the non-political branch of governmentprecisely because they have been unable to achieve their desired policy
goals through the elected branches. The Chief Justice's criticism of the
'

Id. at 1463-64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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majority's decision on the grounds that it attempts to resolve a broadranging injury harkens back to his confirmation hearings and his insistence
upon securing an actual case or controversy before ruling.
In the rest of his dissent, the Chief Justice takes issue with the
majority's analysis of each of the standing prongs, finding that the parens
patriae doctrine cannot substitute for actual injur,1 39 Massachusetts had
not adequately established a loss of coastlands,' 4 any loss of coastlands
could not fairly be ascribed to the EPA's failure to regulate carbon dioxide
from vehicle emissions, 14 1 and even if the EPA were to regulate, it would
be too speculative to conclude that that regulation would at all reduce
Massachusetts's loss of coastlands.142
That the majority could find standing in these attenuated
circumstances struck the Chief Justice as indicative of a greater problem
with the case: that it would invite the judiciary to serve as a policy forum
rather than as a court of law.14 3 The Chief Justice remarked that the
majority's opinion recalled the Court's decision in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 144 a
decision that many had considered to have reached the outer limits of
Article III standing. Roberts lamented that both SCRAP and the majority's
decision in Massachusetts turn standing requirements into a "lawyer's
game," when they should serve to promote "judicial self-restraint."l 45 As
the Chief Justice pithily remarked, the majority's decision "is SCRAP for a
new generation." 46
Clearly, the Chief Justice failed to convince his colleagues of the
virtues of minimalism in Massachusetts.14 7 Does his own opinion reflect
that minimalism? It would seem that it does. The Chief Justice
39

' Id. at
140 Id. at

1465-66.
1467-68.
141Id. at 1468-69.
14 2 Id. at 1469-70.
143 Id. at 1470.

" 412 U.S. 669 (1973); see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470-71 (Roberts, C.J.
dissenting).
145 See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
146id.
147 Although

he noted that the Court's "special solicitude" analysis by its own terms
applies only to states and thus does not dramatically expand the Court's current standing
jurisprudence. See id.
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throughout his dissent emphasized that his disagreement with the majority
has nothing to do with the global warming crisis, but is born of a concern
not to have the judiciary enter fields where it is neither competent to
expatiate nor authorized to do so by the People. And we have already
seen the Chief Justice's suspicion that Massachusetts and its fellow
petitioners are inviting the Court to weigh in on an issue that has already
been, and will continue to be, thoroughly debated in democratic forums.
But we have here a cleavage in minimalism, between the intrinsic
minimalism that marks prudentialism and the extrinsic minimalism that
marks neutral principles and Sunstein's procedural minimalism. The
Chief Justice would rather defer to the political branches on the question
of EPA rulemaking, not so much because the judiciary will make a mess
of things (although surely that is a consideration), or because EPA's denial
of the petition is the best policy, but rather because the Constitution
forbids the Court from addressing Massachusetts's complaint. In other
words, the minimalism of the Chief Justice's dissent is tied to Article III
itself, to the meaning of the Law itself, and is not a function of extrinsic,
prudential concerns.
That the Chief Justice was not able to convince Justice Kennedy to
join his standing opinion is particularly revealing, given that Justice
Kennedy has joined in a number of the Court's standing-limiting decisions
of the last two decades, including Lujan v. National Wildlife Federationv.
Lujan,148 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 14 9 and Steel Co. Moreover,
Justice Kennedy dissented in Laidlaw Services [CHECK].
Thus,
Massachusetts may represent a loss not just to the Chief Justice's
minimalism, but also to his campaign to convince his colleagues of the
virtues of intrinsic judicial self-restraint.

148

497 U.S. 871 (1990).

504 U.S. 555 (1992). Although in Defenders, Justice Kennedy concurred separately
and indicated that he declined to reach the plurality's discussion of the redressability
prong of the standing analysis. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
149
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C. NationalAssociation of Home Builders (NAHB) v. Defenders of
Wildlife
Is the Endangered Species Act (ESA) a "super statute" that
impliedly amends all federal agency mandates to make species
preservation their number one priority? That was impliedly the issue
raised in NAHB.1 50 The case arose out the EPA's decision not to consult
under Section 7 of the ESA over the agency's transfer of National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) authority to the State of
Arizona. A bit of background: under ESA Section 7, a federal agency
must ensure that none of its action jeopardizes the continued existence of
an endangered or threatened species.'st Under Section 402(b) of the
Clean Water Act, the EPA must transfer authority for the issuance of
pollution discharge permits to a state once that state has met the nine
criteria set forth in Section 402(b).15 2 In NAHB, environmental groups
challenged the EPA's decision not to consult over the effects of its transfer
of NPDES authority to Arizona. Although the EPA advanced a number of
reasons as to why its decision was proper,' 53 the most important of those
for present purposes was its position that, because Section 402(b) on its
face did allow the EPA to decline to transfer NPDES permitting authority
for non-CWA reasons, therefore once a state had met all nine criteria in
Section 402(b), the EPA was required to transfer that authority, the ESA

notwithstanding.1 54
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Alito and
joined in full by the Chief Justice, held that the ESA does not impliedly
amend the CWA, and that once a state has met all nine criteria set forth in
Section 402(b), the EPA must transfer NPDES permitting authority,
50 A

note of disclosure: I drafted an amicus brief in support of NAHB on the merits in
the Supreme Court. Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, NAHB v. Defenders of Wildlife, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (No. 06-340),
available at 2007 WL 542419.
' 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
152 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006).
153 See Natl. Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, at 2527
(2007); see also Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 960-61 (9th Cir.
2005); 67 Fed. Reg. 79,629, 79,630 (Dec. 30, 2002).
154 See NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2527.
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regardless of the transfer's effects on endangered species. 15 5 Because the
Chief Justice did not write an opinion in the case, we shall not tarry long
But it is enough for present purposes to flesh out two
here.
characterizations of the case: it produces arguably an anti-environmental
result, in that species and habitat protection does not become the federal
government's summum bonum, and it bears many hallmarks of Roberts's
minimalism.
First, the majority opinion relies heavily upon a canon of
interpretation-implied repeals or amendments are disfavored-to
determine whether the EPA's and the Fish and Wildlife Service's
interpretations? of ESA Section 7 is reasonable. 156 Although not strictly
speaking part of a textualist analysis, the use of canons often goes hand in
hand with a plain meaning interpretation, and a judge's adherence to
textualism frequently accompanies an acceptance of canons in legal
interpretation.157 To that extent, therefore, the majority opinion both
tracks the Chief Justice's minimalism and, more broadly, prudentialism.
Second, the majority opinion defers to the EPA's and the Fish and
Wildlife Service's interpretation of the ESA's consultation provision.15 8
Although the Court plausibly would have accepted a contrary
interpretation-i.e., one that would apply ESA Section 7 to all agency
action, both discretionary and nondiscretionaryl 5 9 -,the majority also
1ss6 Id. at

2538.

Id. at 2532-33.

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25-26 (Princeton University
Press 1997); Damien M. Schiff, Purposivismand the "ReasonableLegislator":A Review
Essay ofJustice Stephen Breyer's Active Liberty, 33 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REv. 1081,
1105-07, & n.150 (2007).
57

158 See NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2533-36.
59 See id. at 2533, 2535-36. Whether the agencies could reasonably interpret Section 7
to apply to nondiscretionary federal action is of some importance, given that a new
administration might well push to promulgate new ESA regulations, although the effort,
judged from recent attempts, is far from easy. As I read NAHB, the Court merely held
that interpreting Section 7 the other way is a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous
text, but is by no means the only reading to which the Court may defer. See NAHB, id. at
3535-36 ("Nothing in either [Section 7] or the other agency regulations interpreting that
section ... suggests that discretionary actions are excluded from the scope of the ESA.")
(citation omitted). It is interesting to note that the leaked draft ESA regulations contained
a provision that would state explicitly that Section 7 applies to discretionary federal
actionpro tanto. See Draft 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 ("Where an action involves a mixture of
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recognized that interpreting Section 7 to apply only to discretionary
federal action was entirely reasonable, and therefore entitled to
deference. 160 In this regard, the majority opinion tracks the Chief Justice's
minimalism by its deference to the executive agencies' interpretations of
their governing statutes. Although such deference is in perfect accord with
Chevron,'6 ' the Court's nod to the agencies' expertise is particularly
noteworthy here given the lower court's conclusion that the EPA's and the
Service's interpretation was not entitled to deference because the EPA had
reversed course during the processing of Arizona's NPDES transfer
request.162
Third, the majority opinion dispenses with what appears to be a
conflicting precedent-TVA v. Hilll 6 3-by reading it narrowly, or, to use
Professor Sunstein's lexicon, by reducing its "width." The environmental
groups argued that TVA required federal agencies to make species and
habitat preservation the federal government's foremost goal, and cited to
language in the Court's opinion to that effect.' 64 But the majority rejected
that broad reading largely on the grounds that TVA dealt only with a
discretionary federal action and not, as was the case here, a
nondiscretionary federal action.165 Whatever the merits of the majority's
attempt to distinguish TVA, it remains true that the majority's approach to
TVA resembles what Professor Molot has termed "backward-looking"
discretionary and nondiscretionary activities, an action agency need only consult on the
effects of the discretionary activities.").
"0NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2534.
161Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
162 Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir.
2005)420 F.3d at 959.
Justice Stevens in dissent also believed that deference was inapt, but for different reasons,
chief among them the prohibition against agency post hoc rationalization. See NAHB,
127 S. Ct. at 2543-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163437 U.S. 153 (1978).
164 See NARB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (majority opinion); id at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 185) (Section 7 "reveals an explicit congressional decision to
require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving
endangered species. The pointed omission of the type of qualifying language previously
included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious decision by Congress to
give endangered species priority over the "'primary missions"' of federal agencies.").
(uoting TVA, 437 U.S. at 185).
NAHB, 127 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (majority opinion).
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principled minimalism, 16 6 which itself shares much with the Chief
Justice's minimalism.
To a degree, the result in NAHB is not environmentally friendly in
that it declined to place species and habitat preservation at the forefront of
the federal regulatory suite. But the reasoning supporting the Court's
decision is obviously content-neutral, in that the principal argument for the
Court's outcome-the canon against implied repeals-would operate just
as much in favor of environmental causes as it would against them, the
only salient criterion being the chronological order of enactment. And all
of the majority opinion's arguments-canons, deference, and
distinguishing of case law-fit comfortably within the brand of
minimalism that the Chief Justice has espoused. Thus, we can conclude
that NAHB is a minimalist decision and is consistent with the Chief
Justice's jurisprudence, and yet the fact that the case was decided 5-4
confirms that the Chief Justice's minimalism has not won over his
environmentally friendly yet minimalist indifferent colleagues.
D. Rapanos v. UnitedStates

Perhaps one of the most important environmental cases of a
generation, Rapanos concerned the extent of Clean Water Act jurisdiction
over the Nation's waters exercised by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers. 167 The Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants-which
includes dredge and fill material-into the "navigable waters" of the
United States. 68 "Navigable waters" are defined simply as "the waters of
the United States." 1 6 9 The EPA and the Corps had interpreted "waters of
the United States" to include any and all wetlands that have a hydrological

166 See

Molot, supranote 20, at 1833.
Another note of disclosure: my firm represented Mr. Rapanos and his wife before the
Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court. I played a very minor role in the preparation of the
case for the Supreme Court, but I have written elsewhere on the Court's decision. See M.
Reed Hopper & Damien M. Schiff, The Rapanos Case, ENGAGE, 64 (Oct. 2006),
availableat http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070321 EngageOctO6.pdf,at 64.
16s See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344 (2006).
169 See 33 U.S.C.Id. § 1362(7) (2006).
167
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connection with a navigable-in-fact waterbody.o7 0 The petitioner in
Rapanos had been charged both civilly and criminally for violating the
CWA by placing fill material on several wetlands that he owned, which
were connected to navigable waterways, in at least one instance some
twenty miles distant,1 7 ' through a circuitous path consisting of drainage
ditches and streams.172 The question placed before the Court, therefore,
was whether the agency's interpretation of the CWA was reasonable and
entitled to deference.
The Court, in a 4-1-4 decision, determined that the record, as then
constituted, could not support jurisdiction over the petitioners' properties.
All five justices voting to remand the case concluded that the Corps's
hydrological connection rule is an impermissible interpretation of the
statute. 17 3 Justice Scalia authored a plurality opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito, in which he applied a textualist
analysis and concluded that, although the phrase "waters of the United
States" must include some waters that are not navigable-in-fact, the
language cannot be stretched to include topographical features that are not
traditionally referred to as waterbodies.1 7 4 Justice Kennedy, concurring in
the judgment only, took issue with the plurality's reading and opted for a
more purposivist approach,17 5 and developed a "significant nexus" test for
jurisdiction, whereby CWA jurisdiction attaches if the property in question
has a significant effect on the physical, chemical, or biological integrity of
a navigable-in-fact waterway. 7 6
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion bears many traits of the Chief
Justice's minimalism. It closely hews to the statutory text but at the same
time accommodates precedent. Incorporation of precedent is best seen in

170 See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208,at 2217-19 (plurality opinion). The
is published at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2007).
regulation
71ertinent
See Brief
of Petitioner at 5, Petitioners' Opening Brief at 5, Rapanos v. United States,
126. S. Ct. 2208, No. 04-1034 (2006) (No. 04-1034), availableat 2005 WL 3295630.
172 See id. at
5-6.
173See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (plurality opinion); id. at
2247, 2251-52
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
1174
Id. at 2220-21 (plurality opinion).
75
See Schiff, supranote 156, at 1082-85 (explanation of purposivism).
176 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Scalia's handling of Riverside Bayview Homes,17 7 a unanimous
1985 decision in which the Court affirmed CWA jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to a navigable-in-fact waterway.1 7 8 On the basis of that
precedent, the plurality was forced to disagree with the petitioners'
position that CWA jurisdiction extends only to navigable-in-fact
waterways and discharges that actually reach those waterways. 7 9 But the
plurality exhibited "backward looking" minimalism in its limited reading
of Riverside Bayview: Justice Scalia read Justice White's opinion as
addressing only the issue of jurisdiction over wetlands immediately
adjacent to navigable in fact waterways, and as hinging upon the legal
judgment that deference to the Corps would be appropriate given the
ecological judgment that one could not tell, in Riverside Bayview, where
the river ended and the wetland began. 8 0
That the plurality opinion is consistent with the Chief Justice's
minimalism is confirmed by the concurrence authored by Roberts. In that
short piece, the Chief Justice noted that the agencies could have avoided
the loss the Court handed them had they promulgated new regulations. In
2001, the Court in Solid Waste Agency of Northen Cook County
overturned another Corps jurisdictional rule, known as the Migratory Bird
Rule, in holding that CWA jurisdiction does not extend to isolated
ponds.18 Shortly thereafter, the agencies proposed new rulemaking, but
presumably for political reasons no new regulation was promulgated. The
Chief Justice, consistent with his minimalist tendency to defer to agency
interpretations, lamented that the EPA and the Corps had failed to correct
their extravagant view of CWA jurisdiction through new rulemaking.1 82
Roberts emphasized that had the agencies in fact issued new regulations,
they almost assuredly would have a won a legal challenge, given the

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
See id. at 134.
1 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (plurality opinion).
10 See id. at 2225-26. In sharp contrast to the plurality's interpretation, Justice Stevens in
dissent considered Rapanos to be controlled by Riverside Bayview. Id. at 2255 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
181 Solid Waste Agric. of N. Cook County. v. Army Corps of Engin'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
171-72 (2001).
18 2 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
177
178
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Court's generous deference. 183
And a useful distinction may be drawn between the Rapanos plurality
(along with the Chief Justice's concurrence) and the principal dissent authored
by Justice Stevens. I would submit that the latter represents an extreme form of
minimalism, akin to Professor Sunstein's theory, in its almost total deference to
the EPA's and the Corps's interpretation and administration of the CWA. I
would also submit that Justice Stevens's dissent exhibits what I have termed in
this article a strong content-dependence, viz., the dissent's readiness to defer to
the agencies 18 4 (and thus stay the judicial hand) seems to be born in good
measure of a desire to facilitate the policy goals of the Act.1 8 5
Although one might superficially label Rapanos an anti-environmental
case, on close analysis that characterization does not hold up, principally
because nothing in the Court's decision precludes the states from enacting
vigorous clean water laws. Because the case resulted in a reversal of the lower
court's judgment, the decision can be viewed as a victory for the Chief Justice's
minimalism. But in another respect the case represents a loss: the failure of the
Court to issue a single opinion garnering a majority of the Justices' votes. The
Chief Justice alluded to that very failure in his concurrence.186 Perhaps that
outcome represents a strategic error on the Chief Justice's part, in assigning the
drafting of the principal opinion to Justice Scalia. But if so, then even that
failure is consistent with the Chief Justice's jurisprudence: recall that in his
confirmation hearings he disavowed any desire to use opinion assignments
On balance, Rapanos is consistent with the Chief Justice's
strategically."
minimalism, in the centrality of text to the decision, the limited reading of

183 d
184 See id. at 2257 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185 See id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's desire to defer to the EPA
and the Corps in this matter contrasts sharply with his adamant refusal to accord any
deference to the agency interpretation of Section 7 of the ESA at issue in NAHB. See
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, NAHB, 127 S. Ct. 2518,at 254344 (2007). In his defense, however, Justice Stevens argued in NAHB that EPA was not
entitled to deference in interpreting the ESA (as opposed to the Clean Water Act), and
that the Secretary of the Interior's favorable interpretation of the ESA was issued after the
consultation at issue. Id.
86
' See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
187 See Hearings,supranote 26, at 56435.
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precedent, and the aborted deference to the EPA and the Corps.
E. S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine BoardofEnvironmentalProtection (BEP)
Argued the same day as Rapanos, S.D. Warren Co. presented the
issue of whether the issuance of water from a dam could be considered a
"discharge" within the meaning of the CWA, even though the water
emitted is not polluted. S.D. Warren owned several hydroelectric dams
and sought permit renewal from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. The BEP contended that as part of the permit renewal
process, S.D. Warren had to obtain a water quality certification under
CWA Section 401, which imposes the certification requirement on any
activity associated with a "discharge." 1 8 8 S.D. Warren argued that the
flowing out of water from its dams could not be considered a discharge
because the water was not polluted.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Souter, the Court held
that S.D. Warren's dams were in fact discharging water. The Court noted
that the CWA defines "discharge" to include the discharge of a pollutant,
and concluded that "discharge" must therefore mean something more than
just pollution emission, else the CWA's "discharge" definition would be
superfluous. 189
The Court recognized that the ordinary meaning of
"discharge" is "flowing or issuing out," and the emission of water from
S.D. Warren's dams comfortably fit within that definition. 190
That
conclusion was consistent with the Court's decision in PUD No. I of
Jefferson City v. Washington Department of Ecology'9 1 , in which the
Court observed that a dam operator would have to obtain a Section 401
certification for the discharge of dredge and fill material during the course
of the dam's construction, and for the water that would be released from
the dam.192
Both of those activities would involve point source
93
pollution.1 The Court further acknowledged that its interpretation was
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843, 1847 (2006).33 U.S.C.
§ 1311.
9
Id.S.D. Warren Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1847.
188

190 Id.

19' 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
' 92 Id. at 711.
193

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1998).
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(1) consistent with the relevant agency's interpretationl 94, , (2) not in
tension with canons of interpretation , (3) uninformed by the Court's
decision in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee
Tribe'm, (4) supported by the CWA's legislative history 97 , and (5)
consistent with Congress's intention to protect and restore the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity, broadly understood, of the Nation's
waters.198
As has been noted elsewhere,199 S.D. Warren Co. is a noncontroversial opinion. Nevertheless, we can still analyze the case to
determine whether it is consistent in its reasoning with the Chief Justice's
minimalism. On that score the answer is a clear "yes." The case adheres
closely to a textualist analysis: Justice Souter's principal argument for the
Court's disposition is based upon a dictionary definition of the statutory
term "discharge." Questions of agency deference did not arise because
there was no regulation in point. Admittedly, to a certain extent S.D.
Warren Co. is the type of case whose disposition would likely be the same
regardless of the ideological strip of the interpreting judge, but the Chief
Justice's ability to secure a unanimous opinion represents to some degree
a triumph of what I have termed his rules of judicial comportment, which
are a subset of his minimalism. It is interesting to ponder whether the
Court would have remained unanimous had the textualist outcome resulted
in the holding that certification does not apply to "discharges" from dams,
an arguably environmentally unfriendly result. Certainly, where the
textualist answer parts company with environmental policy, the Court
usually fractures along ideological lines, the best minimalist intentions of
the Chief Justice notwithstanding, as happened in Rapanos and perhaps
also NAHB.

194 See S.D. Warren Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1848.
'9 Id. at 1849-50.
196

197

541 U.S. 95 (2004), see S.D. Warren Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1850.
S.D. Warren Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1851-52.

' Id. at 1852-53.
199 See Nancy Kubasek, The New ChiefJustice:Friendor Foe ofEnvironmentalists?, 35
REAL EST. L.J. 464 (2006) (S.D. Warren "was also a rather non-controversial case of

statutory interpretation").
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F. UnitedStates v. Atlantic Research Corp.
Another environmental case garnering a unanimous opinion,
Atlantic Research presented the issue of whether a potentially responsible
party (PRP) under CERCLA could seek to recover the costs incurred in
voluntarily cleaning up a contaminated site where neither the PRP nor the
cost recovery defendant had ever been sued by the government or made a
defendant in a CERCLA contribution action.
The interpretive question thus centered on CERCLA Section
107(a)(4), which makes PRPs (like Atlantic Research) potentially liable
for:
(A) "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan 2 00 ; [and]
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency

plan. 20 1
Atlantic Research argued that Subsection 4(B) authorized it (by
virtue of the phase "any other person") to sue for cost recovery, and that
the phrase excluded only those persons mentioned in the preceding
subparagraph, viz. the United States, the several States, or the Indian
tribes. The government, in contrast, argued that the phrase "any other
person" refers to those persons who are not identified as PRPs in Section
107(a)(1)-(4).202

The Court, per Justice Thomas, using traditional tools of statutory
construction, concluded that Atlantic Research may seek cost recovery
under Section 107(a)(4)(B). Emphasizing that statutes must be read as a
whole, and the obvious structural parallels between Subsections (4)(A)
and (4)(B), Justice Thomas concluded that the plain language of the statute
200

"The national contingency plan specifies procedures for preparing and responding to

contaminations and was promulgated by the [EPA] . . . ." Cooper Indus.., Inc. v. Aviall

Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161 n.2 (2004).
201 42U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
202 United States v. Ati. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331,
at 2335-36 (2007).
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supported Atlantic Research's interpretation. 2 03
Justice Thomas also criticized the government's interpretation, on
at least three significant grounds. First, nothing in Subsection (4)(B)
could naturally be read to refer to the preceding Subsections (1) through
(3); to read Subsection (4)(B) in that manner would "destroy the
symmetry" of Subsections (4)(A) and (4)(B).204
Second, the
government's interpretation would functionally render Subsection
(a)(4)(B) a dead letter, because Section 107(a)(1)-(3) encompasses so
many persons as PRPs.205 Third, the Court's interpretation would "create
friction" between Section 107 cost recovery actions and Section 113
contribution actions, for the latter are available to PRPs who have actually
been made subject to suit, whereas the former are available to those parties
who have incurred costs voluntarily. 20 6 Thus, the Court concluded that
CERCLA's "plain terms" required that Atlantic Research be able to
maintain a cost recovery action.207
Like S.D. Warren Co., Atlantic Research is a case that may well
turn out the same regardless of the interpretive methodology adopted by
the interpreting judge. But just as in S.D. Warren Co., I believe that we
can divine minimalist traits in the decision in Atlantic Research. Most
prominently, Justice Thomas's analysis is (not surprisingly) driven by a
plain meaning analysis, guided by canons of construction, and cognizant
of the structure of the statutory section as well as the statute as a whole.
Also, Justice Thomas is careful to avoid a purposivist analysis, instead
hinging his arguments on points independent of whether the Court's
interpretation will facilitate the clean-up of contaminated sites. 20 8 And
again as in S.D. Warren Co., the Court's unanimous resolution of the
question presented is consistent with the Chief Justice's rules of judicial
comportment. It also bears noting that the Court's disposition is
environmentally friendly, to the extent that it creates incentives for
voluntary clean-up.
203

Id. at 2336.

204 See
20 5

id.
1 d. at 2336-37.

206 Id. at

2337-38.

See id. at 2339.2338.
208 It is true that Justice Thomas notes how the Court's interpretation
will not create
friction between Sections 107 and
207
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IV. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: ROBERT'S MINIMALISM
As I set forth at the beginning of this Article, to determine whether
the Chief Justice's minimalism has had a measurable effect on the Court's
environmental law jurisprudence requires analysis of the relevant cases
according to several factors: whether the Court's decision is consistent
with Roberts's brand of minimalism; whether the Court's result is
environmentally friendly; and, if the Court's decision is minimalist but not
environmentally friendly, whether the Chief Justice's vote was decisive to
the outcome. Our review of the Roberts Court's six environmental cases
reveals a mixed bag of results.
First, of the six cases, the Court's disposition in four of them are
consistent, to varying degrees, with Roberts's minimalism. The two cases
not consistent with his minimalism are Massachusetts, in which the Chief
Justice wrote an extended dissent, and Rapanos, in which he concurred
specifically to express his disappointment that the Court could not produce
a majority opinion. Thus, on this factor, at least superficially, it would
seem that Roberts's minimalism has triumphed.
I
Second, of the six cases, four are environmentally friendly: Duke
Energy, Massachusetts, S.D. Warren Co., and Atlantic Research. Thus, it
may be that, even though Duke Energy, S.D. Warren Co., and Atlantic
Research are minimalist opinions, the Chief Justice's methodology may
not have had anything to do with the Court's disposition (assuming of
course that there are potentially at least five other Justices on the Court
who are willing to produce an environmentally friendly and maximalist
result).
Third, the only case fully consistent with Roberts's minimalism in
which his vote was decisive is NAHB. I do not include Rapanos here
because I do not consider Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test to be
consistent with Roberts's minimalism, although that test will be the one to
which many if not most lower courts look for guidance. 20 9
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (determining
that government may establish jurisdiction under the Kennedy test only); N. Cal. River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 2007 WL 2230186 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2007) (same). But see
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (determining that government may
establish jurisdiction under either the Scalia or Kennedy test); United States v. Chevron
209
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But as I mentioned earlier, our analysis is complicated by the fact
that the Chief Justice's minimalism in important respects is nothing new:
it is really just another version of textualism/originalism operating under a
different label. The Chief Justice's stated fidelity to text, tradition, the
rule of law, content-independent legal reasoning, the separation of powers,
and deference to expert determinations by administrative agencies, is
consistent with the interpretive methodology espoused by Justice Scalia,
and to a slightly lesser degree, Justice Thomas. 210 Even on the periphery
of the Chief Justice's minimalism, i.e., the rules of judicial comportment,
it is not at all clear whether the Chief Justice has had any impact on the
Court's environmental law jurisprudence.
For on the three most
controversial environmental cases of the last two terms (Rapanos,
Massachusetts, and NAHB), the Court split 4-1-4, 5-4, and 5-4. Clarity
and common grounds, in cases where those attributes of opinion writing
most matter, seem lacking under the Roberts Court in the environmental
arena.
What may be most significant about the Roberts Court is that,
contrary to the doomsday predictions of some advocacy groups 2 1 1 and
legal commentators, 2 12 the Supreme Court has not assumed an antienvironment posture. The majority of the Court's environmental decisions
of the last two terms are environmentally friendly in result, and to the
Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (determining that government may
establish jurisdiction under the Scalia test only).
210 My hedging with Justice Thomas is chiefly because of his
views of stare decisis. See
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 19 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(writing that the Establishment Clause should not be incorporated and thus should not
apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would be willing to address the
question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders'
understanding of separation of powers."); Scott D. Gerber, "My Rookie Years Are Over":
Clarence Thomas After Ten Years, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 343, 345 (2002)
("Justice Thomas seems even more willing now than he was during his acclimation
period to say that well-established precedents and/or entire areas of the law should be
rethought."); Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death
Penalty Context, 85 N.C. L. REv. 847, 871 n. 143 (2007) (noting that Justice Thomas does
not believe in stare decisis in cases of constitutional moment).
211 See Hearings,supra note 26, at 824-28 (statement
for the record of Earth Justice).
212 See Kubasek, supra
note 199.
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extent that the Chief Justice has had any affect on those decisions, that
affect is substantively neutral, at least vis a vis environmental protection.
Perhaps the most that can be said on this point is that, if the Congress or
the President operates under a pro-environment policy, then a Supreme
Court led by Chief Justice Roberts will likely reflect that policy, owing to
its history of hewing to text and deference to agency decision-making. If,
however, either the Congress or the Administration is not environmentally
friendly, then it would be unlikely that the Roberts Court would evince an
identifiably pro-environment jurisprudence. Thus, the acid test for what I
have termed the Chief Justice's content-independent minimalism may
come with the impending Presidential and Congressional elections.
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